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This research examines how the South Korean cable television industry
has developed. The research reviews a brief history of the South Korean
broadcast television system and examines the U.S. cable television system to
provide better understanding of the development of the South Korean cable
television. The research explains policies, laws, industrial structure, and three
issues of localism, competition, and diversity. For diversity issue, the research
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provides programming diversity in that the South Korean government
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INTRODUCTION
Fifteen years have passed since South Korea launched a systematically planned
cable television, commonly known as the General Cable Television (GCT).
Despite the short history of the South Korean cable television, the launch of
cable television had been the most contestable issue in relation to the South
Korean television industry for more than a decade. Cable television had placed
important meanings in the South Korean television industry in the sense that the
introduction of cable television meant the transformation of the South Korean
television mediascape.
The South Korean television industry had operated under the duopoly
system of two public broadcasting companies, Koran Broadcasting System
(KBS) and Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), until 1991. 1 In this public
broadcast television system contest, cable television meant the privatization of
the South Korean television industry. 2 In the duopoly system, cable television
meant that South Korea was entering the age of multichannel multimedia with
diversity of content and increased viewer choice. The introduction of cable
television instigated the launch of other television businesses such as Internet
television in 1997 and satellite broadcasting in 2001. The launch of South
Korean cable television also raised such issues of localism, competition, and
1

In South Korea, the public broadcasting system has ‘never been a public system’ (Kim, 1996, p.
93) in that, for example, both KBS and MBC have been the state-established and statecontrolled organizations and yet they have commercial advertisement as the main source of
earning.

2

While the South Korean government prepared for five years (from 1989 to 1993) to launch a
new cable television system, the government licensed a privately-owned broadcast television
network, the Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS) in 1991, planned to license four local private
broadcast television stations in 1993, and finally permitted five privately-owned local broadcast
television stations to operate in five big cities respectively in 1995.
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diversity almost for the first time. All the aspects above indicate that cable
television played an important role in changing the South Korean television
media environment, changing both television policies and structures of the South
Korean television industry.
The purpose of this research paper is to discuss the developmental
process of South Korean cable television in relation to the structural changes of
cable television industry, along with the changing governmental policies, and
then to discuss issues of localism, competition, and diversity. When South
Korean cable system was established in the early 1960s, it was modeled on the
U.S. Community Antenna TV (CATV) cable television system. On the one hand,
therefore, the South Korean cable television has developed similarly to the U.S.
cable television system, but the former has also developed differently from the
latter on the other hand. At this point, the research paper will discuss the U.S.
cable television system to provide a better understanding of South Korean cable
television through comparisons between both countries’ cable systems.
The South Korean cable system had operated in order to transmit mostly
the air-wave radio signals to rural area, but not the air-wave television signals,
until the late 1970s. Since the early 1980s when the transmission and
retransmission of broadcast signals started to expand to television programs
through the cable networks built for radio signal transmission, cable television
had long been considered a profitable and promising business in South Korea.
Accordingly, the South Korean government launched a new cable television
system, the General Cable Television (GCT), on March 1995. After a couple of
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years later, however, the newly introduced cable television system appeared to
be a big failure due to the cumulative deficit to both the government and private
entrepreneurs unlike their expectation. One scholar metaphorically criticized the
failure of GCT as degradation of cable television from the goose that lays a
golden egg to the ugly duckling that would never be transformed to a swan
(Hwang, 2001). Many critics found the reason for the failure to stabilize the GCT
in the South Korean government’s lack of proper policies toward cable television
and recognition cable television as an industry.
The reason why the South Korean government failed to stabilize the new
cable television system in the initial phase emerged from two aspects in terms of
policy-making. First, even though there had already been an established cable
system known as the Relay Cable Television (RCT) under an established law,
the South Korean government set up a new law along with a new cable television
system GCT, leaving the existing cable television system RCT intact. As a result,
there had been two cable television systems operating under two different law
and two different regulatory bodies, competing in a single cable television market.
Second, initial regulation incorporated cable television service into the
existing broadcast television structure without ruining the existing structure (Kwak,
2007). In other words, the South Korean government did not want cable
television to erode the public broadcast television system even though the
government permitted private sectors to jump into cable television business (Lee
& Joe, 2000). One way to protect the public broadcast television system was to
prohibit any privately-owned cable television company from becoming a big
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television conglomerate. As a result, the South Korean government did not allow
horizontal ownership and vertical ownership in the new cable television system
and the government allotted networks to the state-owned companies.
The second factor was possible because of the South Korean
government’s long-term perception of television as the political means rather
than economic and industrial entity (Hwang, 2001). The South Korean
government started to recognize television as similar to other industries after the
government confronted failure, criticism, and even economic crisis of 1997. At
that point, the government began to deregulate in 1998 the ownership limits in
South Korean cable television system by amending the General Cable Television
Law. The government in the end abolished the General Cable Television Law
and the Cable TV Administration Law and in 2000, which had regulated the GCT
and the RCT respectively and had been considered accordingly as the barrier to
the stabilization of GCT. The government integrated them into an amended
Broadcast Law in 2000 and started to control the current cable television system
under the law. Since the early 2000s, South Korean cable television has been
flourishing, growing to 15 million subscribers and a penetration rate of nearly
80% in 2010 (Korea Cable Television Association, 2010). Cable television in
South Korea becomes an important means to watch television today. 3
The South Korean cable television has clearly been stabilized as a
television industry and seems to be successful in business currently. However,
the stabilization as an industry and the success in business are different stories.
3

According to a research (Korean Broadcasting Commission, 2005), television becomes the
most dominant medium used by 89.8% of Koreans. And, 68.5% of those television users have
cable television installed at home, and the proportion is still increasing.
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The South Korean cable television has confronted other television business
competitors in a limited domestic television market since the early 2000s. For
example, the South Korean government permitted Direct Broadcast Satellite
(DBS) based on the rationale that increasing media and channels would provide
television viewers with what they really want to view resulting from diverse
competing television services (Hwang, 2001). DBS has been expected to stop
cable television’s victory by “aggressively pursuing current cable customers for
services” (Carlin, 2000, p. 50), bringing the competition in the fee-charging
broadcasting market (Ha, 2004). Indeed, the DBS subscribers have continued
increasing since DBS was introduced in the South Korean television market.
Accordingly, the story of whether or not cable television keeps thriving in the
South Korean television market is not over.
In accordance with newly emerging television service providers such as
mobile television, Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS), Satellite Digital Multimedia
Broadcasting (SDMB), Terrestrial Digital Multimedia Broadcasting (TDMB), the
internet-based multi-channel broadcast services (IPTV), and mobile broadcast
service through broadband wireless Internet (Wibro), scholars’ concerns about
cable television have lessened as many scholars have turned their interests over
to new television media. This research paper mentioned earlier that South
Korean cable television has important meanings in terms of the transformation of
television mediascape in South Korea. Before the introduction of new cable
television system, there had been few debates over the issues such as localism,
competition, and diversity, and the television laws and policies had rarely been
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discussed in depth in South Korea; rather, full discussion of all those subjects
above occurred after the introduction of GCT. Furthermore, the policies toward
the newly emerging television media mentioned above are mostly established on
the basis of the Broadcast Law of 2000 that was born through the 10-year’s trial
and error of cable television carry-out. Therefore, we can hardly catch the
meaningful aspects of new television media industries in the contemporary South
Korean television mediascape without understanding the developmental process
of the South Korean cable television. So much so that, it is timely for a study to
revisit the South Korean cable television for better understandings of overall
television industry in South Korea.
The South Korean cable system was modeled on the U.S. cable television
system when the South Korean cable radio system in 1961 – cable television
system later in the late 1970s and early 1980s – was established. Therefore,
there are many similarities between the two cable television systems though
there are also some significant differences between the two systems. One major
difference between the two systems is that cable television in South Korea has
been developed in accordance with the government’s political interest unlike the
U.S. cable television system which emerged from consumer’s demand. In other
word, while the U.S. cable system evolved from the necessity of business
expansion by relaying over-the-air television signals to fringe areas, the South
Korean cable system evolved from the necessity of political justification and
propaganda of the Park Chung-hee’s military government (1961 – 1979) by
transmitting over-the-air radio signals to fringe areas. The initial phase of the
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South Korean cable television during the late 1970s and the early 1980s is
almost similar to the U.S. cable television of the 1950s and 1960s in terms of the
business practice, which was the relay of over-the-air television broadcast
signals. In addition, the South Korean cable television has undergone the exact
same process as the U.S. cable television since the deregulation of ownerships
in cable television began in the late 1990s; that is, the concentration of
ownerships in a few big conglomerates.
After the discussion of the developmental process of the cable television
of both South Korean and the United States, this research paper will discuss the
issues relating to cable television: localism, competition, and diversity. The
South Korean government’s basic agenda to introduce cable television has been
to provide the South Korean television viewers with diversity of content and
channel choice. In addition, the diversity agenda has always been included in
the government’s justification whenever it establishes any new television service
provider. Thus, I will focus more heavily on the diversity issue rather than on
localism and competition. There are four types of diversity: viewpoint diversity,
outlet diversity, source diversity, and program diversity (FCC, 2002; Kunz, 2007).
Following the South Korean government’s justification, the research paper will
describe an empirical study on program diversity among four types of diversity in
order to reveal whether or not the South Korean cable television provides
diversity of content for television viewers.
The introduction of a new cable television system GCT was a major
turning point in the whole South Korean television industry. At this point, a brief
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history of South Korean television system is in order before discussing cable
television more specifically. This will give a clearer understanding of how the
South Korean television mediascape started to be transformed in accordance
with the introduction of a new cable television system.

9

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SOUTH KOREAN
BROADCAST TELEVISION SYSTEM
The very first broadcast television in South Korea appeared as a privately-owned
commercial television station, HLKZ-TV. It was launched on March 12, 1956 by
KORCAD, which was the South Korean branch of the American television
manufacturing company RCA, for the purpose of promoting sales of television
sets in South Korea. It aired television programs two hours a day. Shortly after,
on March 6, 1957, however, RCA turned the station over to a South Korean daily
newspaper Hankook Ilbo due to deficit operation. Hankook Ilbo operated the
station under Daehan Broadcasting Company (DBC). But, the station was wholly
destroyed by fire in 1959 and DBC stopped its broadcast television business in
1961.
Soon after the DBC’s stopping its service, Park Chung-hee’s military
government (1961 – 1979) established a state-owned television station, KBS-TV,
on December 31, 1961 and started to air its programs in 1962. Later, Park’s
government allowed two privately-owned commercial television stations:
Tongyang Broadcasting Company (TBC) on December 7, 1964, and Munhwa
Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) on August 8, 1969. Under the guise of
promotion of just and fair television culture, the Park’s military government
established the Korean Broadcasting Corporation Law in 1970. The Park
government launched in 1973 a public broadcasting corporation and seemingly
transformed the state-operated television station to public television station
operated by the public broadcasting corporation, which was owned and
controlled by the Park government. Even though Park created a public
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broadcasting system and permitted the privately-own television stations, they had
been thoroughly controlled by Park government’s political interest until he died in
1979:

Television was seen as an important instrument to consolidate
national identity, security and development, as well as to provide
support for Park’s dictatorship during its 18-year regime through the
imposition of severe censorship over content (Lee & Joe, 2000, p.
133).

In 1980, South Korea entered the second military regime after Chun Doo-hwan
seized power through his military coup. One of Chun’s primary imperatives
shortly after his coup was to reform the contemporary media systems in South
Korea. At the end of the 1980, the Chun’s military government established the
Prime Press Law, by which private ownership of broadcasting media was
completely prohibited. Except MBC for television and a religious station Christian
Broadcasting System (CBS) for radio, all radio and television stations were
integrated into the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS). Since then until 1990,
the South Korean over-the-air broadcasting systems have operated under public
management. However, it is hard to say that the two networks are purely public
when we look at the main sources of revenue of two public broadcast networks,
KBS and MBC. KBS’s main sources of revenue have been license fees and
advertising while MBC’s main source has been advertising. Furthermore, all
advertising for both networks was controlled by Korean Broadcasting Advertising
Corporation (KOBACO), which was a governmental institution. In these senses,
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public broadcast television in South Korea seemed to be closer to a statecontrolled duopoly system of KBS and MBC.
In the 1960s and 1970s, television system in South Korea had operated
under the coexisting system of public and commercial broadcast television.
During the 1980s, South Korean broadcast television had operated in the
duopolized public system. However, the duopoly system of public broadcasters
started to change in the late 1980s when the South Korean civil government
decided to allow private ownership in cable television and local broadcast
television stations. Since private ownership was allowed in cable television, the
South Korean television industry has transformed dramatically along the
controversial shifts of policies toward cable television several times.
In the next two parts of the paper, this research paper will examine the
development of cable television systems in terms of policies and industrial
structure. The paper will first discuss the U.S. cable television system in relation
to the American policies and industrial structures in that the South Korean cable
system was modeled after the U.S. cable system. Then, the paper will secondly
discuss the South Korean cable system with regard to the policies and industrial
structures. This comparison will provide a better understanding of the South
Korean cable television system.

12

CABLE TELEVISION IN THE UNITED STATES
U.S. cable television emerged in the late 1940s. The purpose of cable television
was to enhance and provide the broadcast television signals reception in fringe
areas such as rural and mountainous communities where it was hard for the
television users to view the over-the-air television programs with the conventional
television antenna. It was adopted in a small scale using the shared
noncommercial community antenna television services (CATV). However, the
development was slow and intensively local until the late 1950s (Parsons, 2008)
because CATV was considered to be “simply a local retransmission service” of
broadcast television signals (Crandall & Furchtogot-Roth, 1996, p. 2). 4 Because
of this retransmission function, CATV had not been considered as a threat to the
broadcast television industry by both the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) and broadcast television entrepreneurs in the 1950s (Crandall &
Furchtogot-Roth, 1996) even though the first subscription cable television system
was established in Lansford, Pennsylvania in 1950.
The U.S. CATV industry began to grow more rapidly after several CATV
operators were able to deliver broadcast signals hundreds of miles away by
using microwave in the late 1950s (Gomery, 2000; Mullen, 2008). Local
broadcasters considered the distant retransmission of broadcast signals as a
threat to their businesses and they forced the FCC to restrict the CATV
operators’ importation of distant television signals. Then, the FCC started
regulating the U.S. cable industry in order to protect local broadcast stations, and
4

This ‘retransmission service’ had been accepted as a major function of cable television until the
late 1970s (Mullen, 2008).
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the FCC’s regulation of the U.S. cable industry continued mostly for two decades
of the 1960s and the 1970s until the Commission abandoned most of restrictions
by 1980 (Crandall & Furchtgott-Roth, 1996).
In 1962, the FCC established a rule that CATV should carry local signals
but not distant signals that duplicated the local stations. The FCC’s regulation
slowed the development of the U.S. cable industry during the 1960s (Albarran,
2002; Gomery, 2000). Nevertheless, several large corporations already started
to become multiple system operators (MSO) in the early 1960, creating regional
consolidation of ownership through buy-out of the small systems.
The period of 1968-1974 was characterized by three rules: 1) antileapfrogging rule; 2) syndicated exclusivity rule; and 3) public access rule. Under
anti-leapfrogging rule, cable systems should carry all local broadcast signals and
they were allowed to import the distant signals. Under the syndicated exclusivity
provisions, however, any cable system was not able to show “a program via the
transmission of a distant station it carried if a local station held exclusive rights to
the program in that particular market” (Mullen, 2008, p. 100). With the public
access rule, the FCC regulated that cable systems that had over 3,500
subscribers should set aside non-commercial cable channels for public,
educational, and governmental programming, commonly know as PEG, and
cable systems in the top 100 markets had to provide four public access channels
for members of the community.
However, the FCC had abandoned “most of restrictions on how many and
what kind of signals cable companies could carry” by 1980 (Crandall &
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Furchtgott-Roth, 1996, p. 4) since the Commission viewed the U.S. cable
television as a competitor rather than a harm to the U.S. broadcasters by
concluding that “the public stood to gain more than television broadcasters stood
to lose” (Brainard, 2004, p. 63). The FCC eliminated the public access rule in
1974, permitted to import unlimited distant signals in 1976, and lifted the
syndicated exclusivity provisions in 1980. The only restriction remaining by 1980
was the 1975 sport-related blockout rule.
The FCC’s lifting of the syndicated exclusivity provisions made
programming more available for cable operators and brought increasing number
of subscribers. However, local authorities regulated still subscription rates to
protect local broadcast television stations. Accordingly, the U.S. cable television
industry lobbied to eliminate municipal service requirements and regulation of
rate, and the U.S. Congress responded to the U.S. cable television industry to
remove the stranglehold of municipal rate by passing the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984 (Crandall & Furchtgott-Roth, 1996). 5 In 1992, however, the
U.S. Congress passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act, and the law re-imposed both municipal and federal rate
regulations. In the Telecommunication Act of 1996, the U.S. Congress removed
federal rate regulation but left the rate regulation to the local municipalities as
being negotiable for basic services. To summarize, the U.S. cable television
industry has operated as the most unregulated entity since 1980, no matter how

5

In addition, the Cable Act of 1984 prohibited the broadcast networks from owning cable systems
and telephone companies from owning the systems within their service regions (Crandall &
Furchtgott-Roth, 1996).
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laws and policies toward the cable industry had been changed in the United
States.
The U.S. cable television industry has basically operated under a
monopoly structure. The U.S. cable television industry evolved from locally
owned franchises: “the core of the cable television operation, where the
programming meets its customers, is the basic local franchise” (Gomery, 2000, p.
253). Through the franchising process on a competitive bid basis, one cable
operator gains a franchise from the local franchising authority – the operator
tends repetitively to gain a franchise on the renewal basis. This franchise system
creates a monopoly structure of the cable industry at local level, meaning that “if
a household wanted to subscribe to cable TV, it had only one choice of supplier”
(Albarran, 2002, p. 87). Under this monopoly structure of the U.S. cable industry,
ownership has become more concentrated through horizontal and vertical
integration in the industry. Corporations typically collect franchises under one
corporate umbrella to increase their profits, creating multiple system operators
respectively (Gomery, 2000). The corporations attempt to reduce the risk in
obtaining programs through vertical integration between program production and
cable distribution. As a result, Megan Mullen (2008) explains:

Today, two corporations, Time Warner and Comcast, control the
vast majority of local cable systems in the United States.
Additionally, cable MSOs have tended to be owned by other media
or telecommunications conglomerates, thereby contributing to and
benefiting from the synergy generated within those corporations. (p.
19)

16

Cable television is basically the “television for a fee” (Parsons, 2008, p. 109).
The subscribers pay for their cable television installation on monthly basis. Thus,
the number of subscriber influences the cable system’s revenues. The cable
industry continues to grow in terms of subscriber penetration to the extent that
nearly 75 million U.S. households subscribe cable networks services –
approximately 70 % of total U.S. television households (Blumenthal &
Goodenough, 2006). Along the increasing subscribers, the cable industry uses
multi-layered markets for financing, such as basic service, premium service, pay
service, advertising, pay-per-view, equipment rental, installation fee, cable
modem, and the like. Among them, the most lucrative market is basic cable
television service, accounting for nearly 60 % of total industry revenues in 2009
(National Cable & Telecommunications Association, 2010).
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF CABLE TELEVISION IN SOUTH KOREA
The major function of South Korean cable television was the same as U.S. cable
television which was developed in order to help “the transmission of over-the-air
television in order to serve those who could not receive local broadcast signals”
(Pacey, 1985, p. 81). Unlike the U.S. cable system starting from transmission of
television signals, the South Korean cable system was adopted to deliver the airwave radio signal to rural areas that had poor reception of radio signals in the
early 1960s. However, the adaptation of cable system in South Korea rooted in
political interest rather than media expansion imperatives. Right after Park
Chung-hee seized power in a military coup in 1961, the military government
eagerly promoted the cable radio broadcast in order to justify his military coup
nationwide and to propagandize the Park government’s political agendas later on.
Accordingly, the government established the Amp Town Project 6 by enacting the
Administration Law of Cable Broadcast Transmission and Reception on
September, 1961. Following the project, the government began to construct the
cable networks to the fringe areas in South Korea for the radio signal reception
and to supply the radio sets, amplifiers, and loud speakers for rural areas. Later
in the 1970s and 1980s, the cable networks for radio signal transmission started
to be used to transmit the over-the-air television signals after the South Korean
military government established a state-owned television station. However, the

6

With regard to the Amp Town system, basic concept is almost the same as the early CATV in
the United States. What difference is to connect a cable to a shared loud speaker with an
amplifier, instead connecting the cable to a shared community television antenna as in case of
the CATV.
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South Korean cable television had developed in a small scale limited to a few
urban areas until the early 1980s.
Similar to the U.S. cable television system, the initial cable television
system in South Korea functioned to retransmit broadcast signals. After cable
television expanded to the rural communities which had poor signal reception,
another important function had been added to retransmission, which was to relay
the broadcast signals at the same time as the over-the-air television stations
televise their signals (Nam, 2008). At this point, the early South Korean cable
television system had long been characterized the so-called Relay Cable
Television system (RCT) and operated under this system. In this system, a relay
operator (RO) is able to transmit broadcast television programs permitted by
Ministry of Information and Communication at the same time as the relay
operator directly receives the programs from over-the-air television stations or to
retransmit them later.
To promote the RCT, the South Korean government formed a scheme for
cable television in 1982 as a part of the Fifth Economic Development Plan (Lee &
Joe, 2000). However, the RCT had still limited to certain areas until 1986. Since
the establishment of the CATV Law in 1986 under which the South Korean
government granted the license for the legally registered relay operators to open
for their business in urban areas, the RCT had spread nationwide. However, the
law brought up not only the legal relay operators but also illegal relay operators
who considered the cable television as a profitable and promising business,
resulting in competition between legal relay operators and illegal relay operators
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in the South Korean cable television industry. As a result, both legal and illegal
relay operators focused on their business to transmit widely low quality video
programs in order to have more subscribers rather than relaying the broadcast
signals. From then on, the South Korean cable television started to be “no longer
simply a system for re-transmission of broadcast signals” (Calabrese & Wasko,
1992, p. 123) at some points. To resolve the problem, revising the CATV Law of
1986, the South Korean National Assembly established the Cable TV
Administration Law in 1987 which limited the programs on the cable television to
the over-the-air broadcasting signals and public information (Lee & Joe, 2000).
Since 1986, the RCT had been perceived as one of the most promising
and profitable businesses in South Korea. Nevertheless, the South Korean cable
television industry had not developed as well as people had expected due to its
small-scale business with regard to the RCT. Accordingly, demands for creation
of a new cable television system had been continuously raised from the diverse
cable television related sectors such as academia, industry, governmental
institutional, etc., along with the public’s demand for multichannel television
environment. At this point, a presidential candidate, Roh Tae-woo, set up the
cable television issue as one of his campaign pledges.
After Roh Tae-woo became the President of South Korea, the nature of
South Korean cable television industry dramatically changed from a small scale
RCT business to a new big cable industry. The South Korean government
decided to establish a new cable television system and launched a working
group in 1989, the Broadcasting System Research Commission, in order to
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investigate the problems and possibilities of the new system before it was
introduced. After the group’s test-run to 10,000 households, the South Korean
government decided to launch a new cable television industry, which was called
the General Cable Television (GCT), in six big cities on March 21, 1995,
established the General Cable Television Law on December 31, 1991, and
selected 53 system operators and 21 program providers. Then, by revising the
General Cable Television Law in 1993, the South Korean government reselected
116 system operators and 20 program providers for 11 programming fields such
as news, movies, sports, culture, entertainment, education, music, children,
women, transportation and tourism, and religion (Kim, 1996). 7 Later on in 1997,
the South Korean government expanded the GCT services from six big cities to
small cities and rural areas and permitted an additional 24 system operators.
When the South Korean government introduced the GCT and composed a
law regarding the GCT, its primary concern was that the existing public
broadcasting system should not to be eroded by privately operated large media
corporations (Lee & Joe, 2000). In the General Cable Television Law of 1993,
therefore, the South Korean government strictly regulated the GCT through
ownership restriction. 8 The law prohibited the industry from being horizontally
and vertically integrated. In addition, the government assigned two state-owned
7

Among the 20 programming fields, however, the potentially expected profitable fields, such as
movie, sports, drama, and entertainment, were allocated to chaebols, which refers to the South
Korean family-controlled conglomerates (Kim, 1996; Shim, 2002).

8

Article 4 of the Cable TV Law of 1993 says:
• Cross-ownership between and among system operator (SO), programming provider (PP),
and network operator (NO) is not allowed, except for the government invested companies
and public institutions
• Multiple-ownership of more than one operating system is not allowed, to avoid
horizontal concentration
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corporations as network operators, which is technically the most crucial part in
cable television industry. As a result, any big media corporation was not able to
be formed in South Korea in the initial phase of GCT.
Despite the investment of tremendous national budget and private funds
to the GCT, expecting high economic profit both for the country and for the
entrepreneurs, the GCT appeared as a fiasco due to the large cumulative deficit
for three years resulting from strict regulation and economic crisis in 1997. In
response to the big failure, the South Korean government started to deregulate
the industry (Kwak, 2007; Lee & Joe, 2000). The government amended the
General Cable Television Law in 1998. The most significant aspect of the
amended cable television law was the deregulation of ownership. The law
allowed cross-ownership between system operators, program providers, and
network operators. Two years later in January, 2000, the government
established an amended Broadcast Law, integrating all cable television
regulatory rules into the law by abolishing the General Cable Television Law
toward the GCT and the Cable TV Administration Law toward the RCT.
From the beginning of the GCT, the South Korean cable television market
had been uniquely structured in two aspects: 1) three separate business areas of
System Operator (SO), Program Provider (PP), and Network Operator (NO); and
2) coexistence of the RCT and the GCT. The first structure comes from dividing
the SO and the NO. Network is a technically critical domain not only for cable
television but also for all other media in terms of providing content service. 9

9

In this research paper, network refers to the cable line or lines which cable television uses to
transmit programs.
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However, the separation of the SO from the NO in business practices made it
hard for a SO to provide channels, which is the fundamental role of the SO, in the
sense that the SO rests too much on an NO’s interest when the SO does not
have its own network. 10 For instance, two state-owned NOs, the Korean
Telecom Corporation (KT) and the Korean Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO),
which had controlled the whole cable networks in South Korea, stopped
investing in cable network construction after the economic crisis of 1997, and
these NOs’ decision made it for many SOs to retrieve their business from the
South Korean cable television industry because the SOs was not able to obtain
enough cable networks to acquire enough subscribers to survive (Hwang, 2001;
Lee, Kim, & Koh, 1999).
The second structure of South Korean cable television industry had been
characterized by its dualistic structure: 1) the preexisting small cable television
RCT; and 2) a newly emerging big cable television GCT. This situation
happened because the South Korean government excluded the locally based
relay operators of the preexisting RCT when selecting the system operators for
the GCT. As a result, two similar industries coexisted within the same cable
television market, regulated by different regulation laws and different regulatory
bodies; that is, the Ministry of Culture & Tourism regulated the SOs and PPs
under GCT system with the General Cable Television Law and the Ministry of
Information & Communications regulated the NOs under GCT system and the
ROs under RCT system with the Cable TV Administration Law. The coexistence

10

The dispossession of a SO’s own network caused also the disadvantage in subscriber
gathering competition against a RO which had its own network.
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of the GCT and the RCT, competing with each other for subscribers, meant that
SOs had difficulty obtaining enough subscribers for their survival whereas ROs
had already secured SOs’ potential subscribers. In other words, SOs struggled
to acquire subscribers while the local ROs were increasing their subscriber
numbers (Lee, Kim, & Koh, 1999). The coexistence of two cable television
systems in the same market would not be problematic to the entrepreneurs if the
merges and acquisitions were allowed between ROs and SOs. However,
separate laws administered by different regulatory bodies of the Ministry of
Information & Communication to the ROs and the Ministry of Culture & Tourism
to SOs made the activities impossible. Consequently, the exclusion of the ROs
when launching the GCT was considered as the fundamental reason that the
South Korean cable television industry had failed to advance toward a profitable
sector in the overall broadcasting marketplace (Kwon & Oh, 2005).
Based on continuous critiques and suggestions from diverse players from
the economic, the politic, and the public, the government started examining the
laws thoroughly in attempts to resolve the problems. In the end, on December
28, 1999, the Korean Congress passed an amended Broadcast Law which
included the General Cable Television Law and the Cable TV Administration Law
and decided to enforce the Broadcast Law of 2000 by abolishing the two
separate cable TV laws of RCT and GCT in January, 2000. Not only did the
amended Broadcast Law make it possible for a RO to transform into a SO, but it
also allowed mergers and acquisitions among SOs and between ROs and SOs.
Consequently, 5.7 million households were estimated to turn into the SO
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subscribers by 2004 since the ROs were allowed to transform themselves to the
SOs. Even though the South Korean government permitted a RO to be
transformed to a SO, the dualistic structure of the South Korean cable television
industry is still alive in a small scale.

TABLE 1 – The South Korean Cable Television Before and After 2000
Before
Cable
System
Law

Regulatory
Body

RCT

GCT

After
GCT

Cable TV Administration
Law of 1987

General Cable Television
Law of 1993

Broadcast Law of
2000

Ministry of Information &
Communication

Industrial
Structure

Separated or Combined
business of RO and NO

Programs
Transmission

Retransmission of
the over-the-air television

Monthly Fee

$3 to $4

- SO: Ministry of Culture &
Tourism
- PP: Ministry of Culture &
Tourism
- NO: Ministry of Information
& Communication
Separated business of SO,
PP, and NO

Korea Broadcasting
Commission

Separated or
Combined business
of SO, PP, and NO
- Transmission of programs provided by PP.
- Retransmission of the over-the-air television and
DBS programs
$17
Wide range

The most significant aspect in the Broadcast Law of 2000 was deregulation of
ownership. The law allowed multiple-ownership, which led to creation of the
multiple system operator (MSO) and multiple programming provider (MPP).
Consequently, nine MSOs were formed by 2005, which held 70 % of the whole
South Korean SO market (Youn & Kim, 2006). Among the nine MSOs, top five
MSOs held 56.2% of the market in 2005 and they take currently 70.3 % of market
share in March, 2010 (Table 2). The law allowed also cross-ownership between
SO, PP, and NO, which led to creation of the multiple system operator and
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programming provider (MSP) and the multiple system and network operator
(MSNO). As a result, for example, four MSPs were formed by 2004 (Kwak,
2007).

TABLE 2 – The Market Shares by Top Five MSOs from 2005 to 2010
MSO
# of SOs
C&M
CJ

2005
16

2006
16

2007
15

2008
15

2009
15

2010
15

Subscribers

1,556

1,905

2,028

2,081

2,153

2,154

# of SOs

8

10

13

14

14

14

Subscribers

1,244

1,516

2,132

2,556

2,514

2,531

# of SOs

12

12

12

12

12

10

CMB

Subscribers

910

1,139

1,197

1,216

1,237

1,296

# of SOs

8

10

11

11

10

8

HCN

Subscribers

859

1,029

1,141

1,198

1,182

1,348

# of SOs

21

20

18

15

15

21

Subscribers

2,746

2,938

2,666

2,759

2,857

3,396

Top 5’s Subscribers

7,315

8,527

9,164

9,810

9,943

10,725

Total Subscribers

13,026

14,031

14,215

14,866

15,260

15,265

Total Households

17,390

17,858

18,327

18,787

19,247

19,707

Top 5’s market share rate
56.2%
60.8%
(Top 5’s Subs/Total Subs)
Penetration rate
74.9%
78.6%
(Total Subs/Total HS)
Source: the Korea Cable Television Association
* Unit for subscribers: thousand

64.5%

66.0%

65.2%

70.3%

77.6%

79.1%

79.3%

77.5%

Tbroad

The law also allowed chaebols 11 and foreign companies to hold up to 33 % of
shares in cable operation companies, which was previously prohibited, and the
law increased the rate up to 49 % in 2004. The Broadcast Law of 2000 changed
the license system of PP to the registration system. As a result, big television
companies with the large amount of capital and the powerful know-how of

11

A chaebol refers to a South Korean family-controlled conglomerate.
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production were able to enter into commercial channels such as sport,
entertainment, and drama. The entrance of big media companies into PPs and
MPPs and the entrance of chaebols and big foreign funds to SOs and MSOs are
viewed as the signs of monopoly and oligopoly in the South Korean cable
television industry, which indicates that “cable television … control over
increasingly concentrated supplies of cable programming rests in [big] private
hands” (Calabress & Wasko, 1992, p. 121).
Since 1995 when the GCT started, the market of the South Korean cable
television industry has steadily grown. In 2010, South Korea has 15.3 million
cable households out of 19.7 million total households nationwide, which is
approximately 78% of households (Table 2). In this large subscriber market, the
financing of the South Korean cable television industry is exactly the same as in
the U.S cable industry: subscription fees, by service tier, pay services including
pay-per-view, equipment rentals (boxes and modems), installation fees, and
revenues from advertising. However, the South Korean cable industry was rarely
profitable despite the rapid market growth until the early 2000s. For example, the
SOs recorded a $50 million deficit in 1995, a $57 million deficit in 1996, and a
$5.7 million deficit in 2000; and the PPs recorded a $180 million deficit in 1995, a
$240 million deficit in 1996, and a deficit of $85,000 in 2000. 12

12

Sources are retrieved from the Korean Broadcasting Institute (2000), the Korea Information
Society Development Institute (2000), and the Korea Broadcasting Commission (2000; 2003).
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THREE ISSUES: LOCALISM, COMPETITION, AND DIVERSITY
Localism
Historically, the U.S. Federal Communication Commission has emphasized
localism, holding that the best broadcast practice is locally generated and
operated (Gomery, 2000). This idea of localism with regard to broadcast
television has also been applied to the U.S. cable television industry. Thus, the
cable television policies in the United States have evolved to balance localism
(Calabrese & Wasko, 1992). To regulate the cable industry in the early
development stage during 1950s and 1960s was to protect local broadcast
stations, which were considered a primary resource for representing local
communities. To regulate the industry to carry locally originated programming
was to promote local communities and identities. Deregulation in the Cable Act
of 1984 based on the FCC’s concept of ‘effective competition’ was also to
encourage localism through competition between local cable television and local
broadcast television. However, the deregulation promoted the ownership
concentration in terms of programming recruiting and diverted the concerns of
cable television industry away from localism as Calabrese and Wasko (1992)
argue:

In the process of its evolution, cable industry leaders have made
little effort to develop a system which is responsive to the spirit of
localism which was present in the early visions of cable, nor have
they been responsive to independent programmers. In fact, there is
hostility by dominant players in the cable industry to sources of
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television programming which are not commercially controlled by
the increasingly concentrated cable cartel. (p.123)

In terms of the South Korean television industry as a whole, there had been not a
similar concept of localism. When the South Korean government introduced
cable radio and CATV in the early 1960s, it was not because of localism but
because of the political goals of justifying the military coup and the government’s
economic development. Several scholars (see Youn & Kim, 2006) argue that the
introduction of the GCT in the early 1990s is the very beginning of localism in
South Korean broadcasting television. However, the decision to introduce the
cable television system in South Korea was not to promote localism but in
response to a public outcry against the low quality video programming on the
RCT and to satisfy economic demands (Lee & Joe, 2000; Youn, 1999). In
addition, the RCT’s function was to relay the nationwide broadcast signals rather
than to carry locally generated programs at that time. In this sense, I would say
that the beginning of private local commercial stations in the mid-1990s, which
started to televise their own locally generated programs, was the advent of
localism in South Korea. Whether the local stations would “help to strengthen
the local community” (Calabrese & Wasko, 1992, p. 136) is still open-ended
question to study further.

Competition
The concentration of ownership in large media corporations is still an issue in
both the U.S. and South Korean cable television industries. In this situation, a
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contestable issue is competition within the industry and between the television
industries. Deregulation since the Cable Act of 1984 in the United States has
promoted rapid growth in cable television service but brought on concentration of
ownership through vertical integration, creating MSOs. Crandall and FurchtogottRoth (1996) argue that competition is not promoted under concentration
environment by explaining that “large MSOs can prevent entry into cable
programming because they favor their own programming and are less likely to
purchase programming in which they have no financial interest” (p. 17).
Furthermore, they indicate three reasons why competition has not emerged:

1) Cable television systems generally required a franchise from a
municipal government. Municipal franchising is often restrictive,
favoring the franchisee and some constituency groups (p. 85); 2)
some competitive situations have been ended by mergers or
system swaps among MSOs (p. 85); and 3) a large share of an
incumbent cable firm’s assets are sunk; therefore, the incumbent
may lower rates substantially in the face of a competitive threat (p.
86)

In terms of the competition between the television industries under the multichannel and multimedia environment, however, Crandall and Furchtogot-Roth
(1996) consider that DBS already became a competitor unlike many other
terrestrial alternatives to cable television in 1996. Goolsbee and Petrin (2004)
explain that the U.S. cable television has not faced many competitors in terms of
the entry or start-ups, but they urge us to reconsider the competition in terms of
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alternative programming sources such as (Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) and
Multichannel Multipoint Distribution Service (MMDS). They hold that DBS is the
only direct competitor to cable television. Otherwise, DBS is to some degree
expected to stop cable television’s winning in television industries by bringing up
the competition and the direction of development in the fee-charging
broadcasting market (Ha, 2004). Unlike the scholars above who consider DBS
as a competitor to cable television, however, Chan-Olmsted (1996a) argues that
DBS does not become a competitor in the concentration structure of the U.S.
cable television industry, which draws on monopoly or oligopoly structure. In
order to justify her claim, she measures the percentage of total market shares
accounted for by the top four (CR4) and top eight (CR8) firms:

The concentration ratios of the top four and top eight MSOs in early
1995 are close to 50% and 65%, which imply a moderately
concentrated industry structure with strong market power
concentrated among the top four firms. If this leading MSOs’ partial
holdings of other MOSs are included, the adjusted CR4 and CR8
are as high as 58% and 73%, approaching a strong oligopolistic
market structure. (Chan-Olmsted, 1996a, p. 31)

These measurements tell that the higher the concentration ratios are, the more
the economic activity is centralized under the control of only a small handful of
firms. In this oligopolistic market structure, she explains, the large MSOs do not
allow the entry or start-ups from the other television industry sectors like DBS. In
this sense, Chan-Olmsted (1996a) claims that a structural regulation on
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integration and concentration “is still necessary to curb MSOs and MPPs
anticompetitive conduct” (p. 39).
The South Korean broadcasting marketplace as a whole has been going
through dramatic changes due to various broadcast service providers such as
DSB, digital DMB, terrestrial DMB, IPTV, and Wibro. South Korea is today
clearly under multichannel and multimedia circumstance, under which the South
Korean cable television industry seems to meet considerable competition. In this
multichannel and multimedia age, Hwang (2001) views that the South Korean
cable television is not guaranteed to survive competition with other new media,
especially, in the limited small market of Korea. Two South Korean scholars,
Youn and Kim (2006), examined how competition appeared between the South
Korean television industries. They claim that the absolute winner is the cable
television industry because of its increasing vertical integration of programming,
distribution, and production in the overall competition. Their findings explain that
the concentration structure of the South Korean cable industry hardly allows the
entry or launch of other television industry sectors; likewise, Chan-Olmsted
(1996a) argues the large MSOs do not allow the entry or start-ups from the other
television industry sectors like DBS in the U.S.

Diversity
With regard to diversity, the FCC (2002) presents four types of diversity:
viewpoint diversity, outlet diversity, source diversity, and program diversity.
Viewpoint diversity refers to the number of media content from a variety of
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perspectives which is available to media users, and it often relates to
informational content relating to the welfare of the public. Outlet diversity refers
to a variety of independent owners who control media outlets, so it relates to how
many independent outlets are available to media users in a given market;
however, the currently increasing media outlets do not reflect an increase in the
number of owners under the concentration of media outlets in a few hands.
Source diversity refers to the availability of media content creators or producers,
so it relates to the number of program producers from which media channels
acquire their programs. Program diversity refers to a variety of programs,
formats, and content, and it is often considered to be achieved through
competition.
In the age of multichannel and multimedia, it is no doubt that there are
increasing number of outlets and channels. However, there is no guarantee that
the variety of outlets and channels reflects true diversity in the era of
concentration. All four types of diversity above are closely related one another,
and they are all satisfied in true diversity. Among the four types of diversity,
however, this research paper examines program diversity in relation to South
Korean cable television in that the government’s justification of the necessity of
multchannel and multimedia has centered on the variety of content and viewers’
choices.
One major point in the cable television industry is the increase in viewing
options in terms of the increasing number of channels provided by the rapidly
growing industry (Kim, 1997). In addition, a research (Korean Broadcasting
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Commission, 2005) reveals that the diversity of channels in cable television is the
second most important factor for viewers to choose to subscribe the cable
television in South Korea. 13 Many people seem to believe that the creation of
new cable television channels means a new level of diversity in content or
programming available to the television viewers (Kubey & Shifflet, 1995). In her
study, for example, Chan-Olmsted (1996b) argues that the increasing number of
children’s channels in cable television industry contributes to the increasing
diversity in children’s programming.
The development of cable television industry in South Korea had played
crucial roles in creating a great deal of channels. Today, the creation of channels
is accelerated by the South Korean cable television industry in competition within
the industry and with other television industries. Peterson and Berger (1975)
indicated that a competitive market leads to diversity. Technology and the
marketplace idea of competition encourage “the proliferation of channels and
new audience markets” (Iosifides, 1999, p. 160). In other words, competition can
increase numerical diversity; that is, competition creates more channels which
can give people more consumer choice. However, Iosifides (1999) argues that
this is just theoretically possible. He holds that the quantitative diversity in terms
of channel variety does not actually reflect the qualitative diversity in terms of
media content or programming. In this sense, Park (2005) examines how
competition under the contemporary South Korean multichannel and multimedia

13

36.1% of the South Korean cable television subscribers answer that they choose the cable
television because of the number of channels; 43.6% of them answer that the most important
factor is the higher definition of cable television than the over-the-air television (Korean
Broadcasting Commission, 2005).

34
circumstance influences the programming diversity of top-ranking cable channels.
She holds that competition and diversity are negatively related; “when a
competitor enters the market, there is generally a drop in diversity” (Park, 2005, p.
51). In other words, she explains that the overall genre diversity on the cable
television tends to decrease when new channels increase as a result of
competition. At this point, it seems true to say that the increasing numbers and
types of channels do not necessarily reflect an increase in diversity of
programming (Calabrese and Wasko, 1992; Kunz, 2007; etc). However, an
examination as to whether or not the South Korean cable television channels
operate with the program diversity is still necessary to provide more empirical
evidence.
In order to examine the program diversity in the South Korean cable
television, I performed a simple case study. The Korean Broadcasting
Commission (2005) reported that almost 90% of the South Korean cable
television subscribers watched two specific types of channels the most: drama
and movie. According to the report, 48.8% of the subscribers watched drama
channels the most and 40.4% of them watched movie channels the most.
According to a South Korean viewer ratings company, ABG Nielsen Media
Research, three drama channels and two movie channels have always been
ranked top ten among the South Korean cable television channels in terms of
viewer ratings in 2009 and 2010. Therefore, I chose three drama channels (KBS
N Drama, MBC Drama Net, and SBS Plus), and two movie channels (Channel
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CGV and OCN). All five channels are included when a subscriber installs a cable
television service.
When examining program diversity, the paper adopted two diversity
concepts to the study: 1) vertical program diversity; and 2) horizontal program
diversity. Grant (1994) defines horizontal program diversity as “the number of
program types available to viewers from all available channels at any given time”
(p. 54) and vertical program diversity as “the number of program types offered by
a single channel over its entire schedule” (p. 54). In the definitions with the term,
program types, programs are classified into one of broad categories such as
news, comedy, drama, movie, variety, etc. This case study has already chosen
two specific types of programs: movie and drama. Even though each channel
chosen for the study operates basically with their specific program types of movie
and drama, the two movie channels offer also a few foreign drama series and the
three drama channels offer other entertainment programs along with drama
series. Therefore, redefinition of the two program diversity concepts is necessary
for the study purpose. Regardless of program types, accordingly, the study
defines vertical program diversity as the number of different programs and
episodes provided in a single channel and horizontal program diversity as the
number of different programs and episodes between two or more similar
channels.
In order to examine program diversity, the study used a programming
schedule of each channel for 100 days from January 1, 2010, to April 10, 2010,
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retrieved from a South Korean portal website, Daum. 14 Using the programming
schedule, the study took four steps to find the numbers of programs offered by
each channel: 1) how many programs each channel provided; 2) how many
times each channel delivered the programs; 3) among the total number of
delivery, how many programs were delivered once and how many programs
were delivered twice or more; and 4) how many programs were shared by the
two movie channels and how many programs were shared by the three drama
channels. The study also transformed the numbers found to proportions to better
interpret the numbers. By comparing the numbers and proportions, the study
revealed whether or not there are vertical program diversity and horizontal
program diversity in relation to the chosen channels. The results show that the
higher the numbers and proportions of programs that delivered once, the wider
vertical program diversity in a single channel, and that the lower the numbers and
proportions of programs shared by channels, the wider horizontal program
diversity between channels.
Table 3 reports vertical program diversity for each movie channel and
horizontal program diversity between two movie channels along with the number
of programs used by each movie channel, the number and proportion of each
channel’s program transmission, and the number and proportion of programs
shared by both channels. Channel CGV offered 333 different movies for 100
days with 173 of these transmitted movies once and 160 movies transmitted

14

There are many websites providing cable television schedule including each cable channel’s
website, but they do not provide the past schedule; rather, they provides schedule on today or
this week basis. Daum is the only site that provides the past cable television schedule. For
schedules, refer to http://movie.daum.net/tv/cable/chartTable.do?channelType=2
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twice or more. With 333 different movie programs, Channel CGV placed 789
slots in its programming schedule for 100 days. A subscriber of Channel CGV
could be exposed once to 333 different movies. For the remaining 456 slots,
Channel CGV filled them with the repeats of 160 movies. OCN offered 296
different movies for 100 days. It transmitted 148 movies once and 148 movies
twice or more. OCN set up 778 slots in its 100-days programming schedule. A
subscriber of OCN could watch 296 different movies once. OCN filled the
remaining 482 slots with the repeats of 148 movies.

TABLE 3 – Vertical and Horizontal Program Diversity in Movie Channels

Number of
programs

Number of
program
transmission

Channel CGV

OCN

Total

Once
Twice or more
Total

173
160
333

148
148
296

Once

333
(42.2%)
456
(57.8%)
789
(100%)

296
(38.0%)
482
(62.0%)
778
(100%)

321
308
629
(100%)
629

Twice or more
Total
Number of programs

938
1,567 (100%)

3

Shared programs
1.
2.

Programs transmission
Vertical diversity: shaded cells
Horizontal diversity: bold italics

3

8

3
(0.004%)
8 (0.013%)

In order to revealed vertical program diversity in each movie channel, the study
examined the proportions of one-time transmission of movie channels
respectively. Channel CGV consisted of 42.2% one-time transmission out of the
total 789 offerings (Table 3). With 42.2% of one-time transmission, the study
found that Channel CGV provided programs in .422 degree of vertical program
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diversity. OCN made up 38.0% one-time transmission out of the total 778
offerings (Table 3). With 38.0% of one-time transmission, the study found that
OCN provided programs in .380 degree of vertical program diversity in OCN.
Comparing the two vertical program diversity degrees, Channel CGV presented
slightly wider vertical program diversity than OCN did. Out of 629 different
movies from Channel CGV and OCN all together, there were three movies
shared by both movie channels. The proportion of shared programs marked
0.004%, which could be said almost Zero. At this point, two movie channels
operated in approximately 1.0 degree of horizontal program diversity.
With regard to the drama channels, the study used a different approach to
examine vertical program diversity and horizontal program diversity. According
to the programming schedules for 100 days, KBS N Drama operated with 48
programs, MBC Drama Net operated with 54 programs, and SBC Drama
operated with 56 programs. The number of each drama channel’s programs is
considerably small, comparing with the two movies channels, but this does not
mean that the drama channels did not have diversity in their programs. Unlike
the two movie channels in which a movie is referred to as a program, the three
drama offered most of their programs classified as program types such as
dramas, variety shows, situation comedies, etc, which consisted of a series of
episodes other than one-time programs. In this sense, the study examined the
number of one-time programs and episodes of programs rather than the number
of programs or program types. If the study examines the number of programs or
program types, the result might appear differently.
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Table 4 presents the number of programs used by each drama channel,
the number and proportion of each channel’s program and episode transmission,
and the number and proportion of programs shared among the channels. In so
doing, the table also reports vertical program diversity and horizontal program
diversity with regard to three drama channels. KBS N Drama set up 1,970 slots
in its 100-days programming schedule with 629 episodes from 48 programs. Out
of its 1,970 slots, KBS N Drama used 692 episodes of dramas, situation
comedies, and variety shows to fill the same number of slots as the number of
episodes. KBS N Drama filled the remaining 1,278 slots by transmitting the 629
episodes twice or more. MBC Drama Net had offered 1,053 episodes from 54
programs with 2,488 slots for 100 days, and it filled 1,435 slots by transmitting
the 1,053 episodes twice or more. SBS Plus used 684 episodes from 56
programs in order to fill 1,863 slots in its 100-days programming schedule. While
684 episodes took charge of 684 slots of SBS Plus, it filled 1,179 slots by
transmitting the 684 episodes twice or more.

TABLE 4 – Vertical and horizontal program diversity in drama channels

Number of programs
Once
Number of
transmission of
episodes

Twice
or more
Total

KBS
N Drama
48

MBC
Drama Net
54

SBS
Plus
56

692
(35.1%)
1,278
(64.9%)

1,053
(42.3%)
1,435
(57.7)

684
(36.7%)
1,179
(63.3%)

1,970
(100%)

2,488
(100%)

1,863
(100%)

Shared
programs/episodes
1. Vertical diversity: shaded cells
2. Horizontal diversity: bold italics

0

Total
158
(100%)
2,429
3,892
6,321
(100%)
0
(0%)
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692 episodes which appeared once in KBS N Drama composed 35.1% of
its 1,970 slots. In other words, KBS N Drama operated in .351 degree of vertical
program diversity. MBC Drama Net’s 1,053 episodes took 43.3% in terms of the
proportion of one-time transmission out of the total 2,488 slots in the channel.
The proportion 43.8% represented .433 degree of vertical program diversity in
MBC Drama Net. SBS Plus came up with 36.7% in terms of one-time
transmission out of 1,863 slots, which stood for .367 degree of vertical program
diversity in SBS Plus. There were no overlapped programs among three drama
channels. At this point, three drama channels operated in 1.0 degree of
horizontal program diversity. However, the result seems problematic. If this
study examined the number of program types, there would be many program
types overlapped among the three channels, so the horizontal program diversity
might appear relatively lower than current degree 1.0. All three drama channels
are subsidiaries of their parent broadcast companies, KBS, MBC, and SBS. Also,
subsidiaries of KBS, MBC, and SBS are program providers for the drama
channels: KBS Media, MBC Production, and SBS Media Holdings. Each
program provider offers programs a drama channel only under its corporate
umbrella, and the programs are mostly the ones that appeared or appear once in
the parent company’s over-the-air broadcast channels. At this point, a major
operation of the three drama cable channels is retransmission of broadcasting
programs (Calabrese & Wasko, 1992).
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CONCLUSION
This research paper has examined on the development of the Korean cable
television system. In so doing, the research paper took account for the relations
between the government policies toward the South Korean cable television and
changes within its industrial structure. Then, the paper discussed three important
issues raised by the introduction of cable television in South Korea: localism,
competition, and diversity. In the section on diversity especially, the research
paper provided empirical findings in relation to vertical and horizontal diversity of
programs in the South Korean cable television channels.
A primary driver of cable television in South Korea was the government’s
political interest rather than public and economic interest. A former South
Korean president Roh Tae-woo proposed a pledge during the 1987 presidential
campaign that he would establish a new cable television system in order to
provide a multichannel television environment for South Koreans, and he began
to set up a plan for the new cable television system, GCT, to fulfill his pledge
after he became president in 1988. Ever since then, however, the South Korean
cable television had been a hot issue for more than a decade in terms of policymaking and stabilization of cable television.
The South Korean government failed to stabilize the GCT in the initial
phase due to lack of proper policies and lack of recognition of cable television as
an industrial property. What Roh government had done during his incumbency
was just to add a new cable system GCT and a new law to an established cable
system RCT controlled by an established law. As a result, two cable television
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systems had coexisted, controlled respectively by different regulatory bodies with
different laws and competing with each other to survive in a single cable
television market. In addition, the South Korean government worried that the
GCT would erode the duopoly system of public broadcasting companies.
Accordingly, Roh government blocked the ways of any privately-owned company
to become a big television conglomerate by prohibiting vertical and horizontal
ownerships in the GCT, which made it hard for SOs and PPs to survive in
competition with the RCT entrepreneurs and with the two public broadcasting
companies.
A couple of years later after its start, the GCT was estimated as a big
failure. Both the South Korean government and the GCT entrepreneurs lost a
considerable amount of money. In order to revive the GCT, the South Korean
government began to deregulate the ownership limitation, amending the General
Cable Television Law in 1998. Furthermore, the South Korean government
integrated three television-related laws into one compressive law, the Broadcast
Law of 2000. Since then, South Korean cable television has been stabilized and
has thrived to the extent that the cable television now reaches 77.5% nationwide
with more than 15 million subscribers.
The introduction of GCT has important meanings in South Korean
television industry. The South Korean television mediascape started to be
transformed since the introduction of GCT. The GCT brought privatization in the
South Korean television market where two public broadcasting companies had
dominated under the duopoly system. The GCT indicated South Korea entered
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the age of multichannel and multimedia. The introduction of GCT raised such
important issues as localism, competition, and diversity of content and viewers’
choices.
While thriving, South Korean cable television has also faced harsh
competition with other TV media such as DBS, DMB, DMB, IPTV, and Wibro.
Cable television in South Korea seems to be beating the competition, but
whether or not it will still be a winner in the future is unknown. The introduction of
GCT was considered to be the beginning of localism in South Korean
broadcasting system (Youn & Kim, 2006). Unlike expectation, however, the GCT
had rarely promoted localism (Lee & Joe, 2000; Youn, 1999) because a
subscriber in a rural area enjoys the same channels and programs as a
subscriber in the capital of South Korea, Seoul, regardless of whether or not a
system operator for the rural subscriber is a local entrepreneur. In terms of
program diversity, this paper performed a small case study with five channels –
two movie channels and three drama channels. According to the findings of the
study, each channel operated in certain degree of vertical diversity but did not so
in a high degree though channels operated with high degree of horizontal
diversity.
With regard to localism and competition issues, this research paper lacks
much explanation of what really happens in the South Korean cable television.
Thus, another project could include an empirical study on those issues to show
what really happens. For the diversity issue, this research paper possesses at
least two weak points. A weakness of the report’s empirical study on program
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diversity is that it cannot generalize the findings to the extent that all other cable
channels operate in the similar degrees of diversity to the five chosen channels.
Therefore, a paper needs to expand cases; for example, the number of channels
of cable television, the program types of cable television and other television
media, etc. Another weakness is that the case study looks at only the program
diversity among four types of diversity: viewpoint diversity, outlet diversity, source
diversity, and program diversity. For instance, the three drama channels seem to
operate with vertical and horizontal diversity of programs, but the program
diversity in those channels reflects neither true program diversity nor source
diversity if compared with the parent companies of each channel. Each drama
channel transmits all the programs that appeared or appear once in its parent
company’s over-the-air television channel(s). Therefore, when all four diversity
types are incorporated in a study, the study can fully explain true diversity in the
South Korean cable television.
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